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Abstract
Our paper calls attention to the heterogeneous levels of competition in EMU banking 
systems. We enhanced the ECB MFI interest rate statistics by calculating a lending rate 
average weighted by loan volumes for each EMU member country. Employing a modified 
Lerner Index, our unique data set enables us to calculate banks’ price setting power in the 
national lending business alone, instead of measuring market power for banks’ total business. 
For 12 countries, we ultimately show that market power in the exclusive segment of lending is 
greater than market power in total banking business. In an OLS regression model, we 
investigate to what extent loan rate variations can be explained by changing degrees of market 
power during the period 2003-2009. Significant cross-country differences can be observed. 
We find that changes in the national degree of competition considerably affect funding 
conditions in the individual countries and therefore hinder a homogeneous transmission of 
ECB monetary policy.
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11 Introduction
The multitude of central bank interventions throughout the global financial crisis has made 
the evaluation of monetary policy actions both a popular and an essential field of study. When 
the European Central Bank (ECB) had been established in 1998, it more or less pragmatically 
decided to use short term interest rates as monetary targets and instruments. The interest rate 
on the main refinancing operations, which provide the bulk of liquidity to the banking system, 
was introduced as the key instrument. Adjustments of the refinancing rate are the central 
bank’s essential tool to meet the (primary and ancillary) targets of monetary policy, i.e. to 
maintain stable inflation, to promote economic growth and to safeguard financial stability. In 
doing so, the ECB implicitly relies on an effective transmission of changes in the official rate 
to bank interest rates for loans as well as for deposits.
However, an effective transmission mechanism requires similar general conditions across 
the currency area. The European Monetary Union (EMU) is instead characterized by a large 
degree of heterogeneity. While regulatory standards have become increasingly harmonized in 
the respective banking systems, major differences in terms of market structures and banks’ 
business models prevail. Moreover, diverse national inflation rates are a persistent feature of 
the currency union. The heterogeneous framework implies that ECB policy measures affect 
macroeconomic developments unequally across euro area countries. Even in case of identical 
macroeconomic constellations the conduct of monetary policy appears to be hampered by 
national banking system characteristics. First and foremost Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) and 
Cecchetti (1999), currently Adams and Amel (2011), identified market concentration as a 
major source of interference with monetary policy transmission. Focussing on the funding 
conditions of enterprises, our paper shall analyse whether changes in national banking 
competition and dissimilar national inflation rates impede a homogeneous transmission of 
monetary policy actions in the EMU.
A meaningful analysis necessitates a precise definition and a correct measure of the 
influencing variables. With regard to the degree of competition in national banking systems, 
we entertain serious doubts about the eligibility of commonly used measurement approaches. 
Without consideration of differing business models and unequal banking market structures, 
previous contributions employed banks’ total business to calculate market power, but often 
applied the subsequent interpretation to the funding conditions of corporations, which is 
rather reflected in the lending business of banks. Consequently, we regard this approach as 
imprecise and not beneficial for the analysis of monetary policy transmission. Hence, our 
2empirical analysis pursues two major goals. Firstly, we develop an adequate measure of 
competition in the specific lending business, which must be regarded as most crucial link to
the real economy. Secondly, our paper displays the impact of changes in the national degree 
of competition on national loan rates and their interference with central bank actions.
Compared to the existing literature our paper offers five major improvements due to 
several specific characteristics in the chosen empirical setting:
(1) Our data set makes use of the ECB monetary financial institutions (MFI) interest 
rate statistics. Thus, we utilize completely harmonised retail interest rate series.
This is a clear advantage compared to previous empirical studies which had to be 
based on national retail interest rate datasets not being harmonised pertaining to 
loan categories, maturities and fixed interest rate periods, and which often exhibited
incomplete and unbalanced samples. Our analysis features no data break or biased 
results caused by dissimilarities of national definitions. 
(2) Moreover, we enhanced the ECB MFI interest rate statistics by calculating an 
interest rate average weighted by loan volumes. To the best of our knowledge, this 
paper displays the first approach that tackled the laborious way through every 
national central bank statistic to calculate an accurate interest rate for total new 
business comparable across all member countries. By this, the explanatory power of 
conclusions regarding national lending business has risen significantly. 
(3) Our empirical setting explicitly includes measures of competitiveness into the 
regression analysis. We employ a modification of the common Lerner Index on the 
banking industry and are able to generate results for specific segments of the 
lending business.
(4) The analysis comprises all founding member countries of the EMU and Greece. In 
doing so, we can detect cross-country differences whereas other studies estimated
euro area wide parameters only.
(5) The deterministic approach applied in this paper directly focuses on the
interdependency between central bank interest rate and bank lending rates. We
avoid any proxies like money market or capital market rates, which fluctuate 
independently from the central bank rate due to exogenous shocks and banks’ 
liquidity management.
Our paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a detailed overview of the 
existing literature on monetary policy transmission and illustrates the heterogeneous 
structures of European banking systems as an explanatory variable of the transmission 
3mechanism in the EMU. Section 3 addresses theoretical as well as empirical problems in 
defining appropriate measures of competition. Section 4 introduces the econometric 
methodology applied in our investigation. The paper closes with discussing the empirical 
results and drawing first conclusions from our findings.
2 Findings on monetary policy and banking market structures
The overall effect of monetary policy equals the sum of the effects conveyed in its 
transmission channels. Thus, the large literature on the monetary pass-through mechanism can 
be categorized according to the channel discussed and reflects the multidimensional character 
of the transmission analysis. Seminal contributions have been provided by Bernanke (1995), 
Mojon (2000) and Mishkin (2001). Regardless of which channel has been opted for scientific
focus almost always is on the speed and the degree to which changes in monetary policy 
affect key macroeconomic variables. Pertaining to the European Currency Union empirical 
literature finds evidence for cross-country differences in how output and prices respond to 
ECB monetary policy actions, e.g. Mojon (ibid.), Peersman and Smets (2001), Angeloni and 
Ehrmann (2003) as well as De Bondt et al. (2005).
The reasons for the heterogeneity as displayed in academic contributions are manifold. 
With respect to retail bank interest rates a multitude of factors determines the level and 
changes of lending and deposit rates. ECB (2001) as well as De Bondt (2005) name the
expected bank exposure to interest rate risk, credit and other risk premia, bank-customer 
relations and implicit level of asymmetric information as vital influencing variables on retail 
bank rates. Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) illustrate the price setting behaviour of banks and 
mention deposit holders’ and borrowers’ interest rate elasticity, regulatory costs, menu cost 
and marginal pricing costs in general. Furthermore, asymmetry in transmission may arise 
from differences in economic structures, as sensitivity to interest rate changes differs across 
sectors. Mojon (2000, 16ff.) points out that variations in the balance sheet structure of non-
financial corporations or private households imply different wealth and income effects 
induced by changes in central bank interest rates. However, as already shown by Kashyap and 
Stein (1997) and Cecchetti (1999), a pronounced role in the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy must be ascribed to financial market structures. The speed and the degree to 
which changes in policy-controlled interest rates are transferred to bank interest rates are
considerably affected by both the structure as well as the competitive environment of the 
banking system. Schwarzbauer (2007) points out that even though the European interbank 
4money market experienced a strong push towards integration by the introduction of the 
common currency, differences in banking market structures continue to exist. This comprises 
both differences in the availability of primary capital market financing, as well as differences 
in the size, local presence, business objectives and degree of concentration of the country-
specific banking systems.
1
Table 1 illustrates the structural characteristics of euro area banking systems at year-end 
2009 and the individual transformations over time starting in 2003. In terms of banks per 
100,000 inhabitants the number of MFIs is spread very unevenly within the EMU. Next to 
Luxembourg, which is recognized as global financial centre, Austria and Finland are endowed 
with high numbers of banks per head. By contrast, the bank density in Greece and Spain 
corresponds to less than 10 % of the Finnish and Austrian figures respectively. Heterogeneity 
is reflected in the national branch density as well, with extreme values observed in Spain and 
the Netherlands. Not only the absolute number of banks, but also the concentration of major 
institutions within countries differs across EMU member states. The computation of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index as well as the Concentration Ratio of the largest 5 banks (by 
total assets) yields varied results. Both indicators imply major bank dominance in Belgium, 
Finland and the Netherlands, while the aggregate market share of large institutions is 
relatively low in Germany and Luxembourg. In respect of current levels of concentration 
Ireland and Italy range close to or below EMU average in 2009. However, during the whole 
period of investigation both countries experienced the strongest trend towards higher levels of 
concentration. In summary, the euro area financial system is characterized by heterogeneous 
national banking systems. The number of banks per head and the distribution of market shares
within countries vary immensely. Eventually, the development over time does not suggest a 
reduction of diversity in the short and medium term.
“insert table 1 about here”
Not only is the conduct of monetary policy affected by the specific features of national 
banking markets, likewise the transmission of ECB actions differs among various loan 
segments. Diversity is reinforced by the peculiarities of the deposit-based lending business. 
Whereas the EMU market for deposits is regarded as highly contestable, the loan market is 
1
Reasons can be found in different historical paths as well as in legal, tax-related, regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks (cp. La Porta et al. (1997), Cecchetti (1999), Danthine et al. (1999), Amable (2003)). Moreover, 
retail customers favour banks close to their neighbourhood and (long-term) relationships. Reputation effects or 
brand names play a major role. As a result, retail loan markets tend to be local even within countries (cp. Gual 
(1999), Cabral et al. (2002, 35f. and 45f.)).
5typically regionally bounded due to asymmetric information (Beck et al. 2004, Corvosier and 
Gropp 2009). Therefore, a harmonisation of the lending business in the euro area is 
improbable soon. Besides, De Bondt (2005) as well as ECB (2001) emphasize that rates on 
consumer loans respond much more sluggish than corporate loan rates and the pass-through 
for long-term lending rates tends to be less complete than for short-term ones. Thus, when 
evaluating the success of monetary policy, the need for differentiation between the particular 
segments of the lending business has become obvious. As a result of the disparate 
characteristics within EMU banking markets, European monetary policy faces a 
heterogeneous environment for the transmission via the banking system. Beyond doubt the 
structural framework of financial systems needs to be incorporated in the decision-making 
process.
As a meaningful consequence of diverse banking market structures and a major influence 
on the conduct of the lending business, the diverse degrees of competition among EMU
banking systems are in a special focus of this paper. The degree of competition both within 
the banking market as well as from substitutive financial market products, i.e. the cross price 
elasticity of bank loan demand, impacts the magnitude and the speed banks adjust their 
lending rates to central bank rates. Ergo, the degree of competition is negatively correlated 
with the degree of bank rate sluggishness. Empirical literature confirms the argument of
deeper and more complete financial markets boosting the speed of the interest rate pass-
through (e.g. Payne and Waters 2008): A higher degree of competition within the banking 
sector and from alternative financial market products (i.e. a higher elasticity of demand for
loans with respect to the retail bank interest rate) is combined with a faster and more complete 
pass-through. Moreover, a higher degree of competition reduces the asymmetries in the 
transmission process. Leuvensteijn et al. (2008) analyse the adjustment of retail bank interest 
rates to changes in (term-) corresponding market rates for 8 euro area countries for the period
1992 to 2004. They find that in a more competitive environment, first, bank loan rates 
respond quicker to changes in market rates, and second, the spread between loan and market 
rates is lower. 
3 Measures of Competition in the Euro Area
In order to evaluate the intensity of competition within a banking system two methods 
come into consideration. Structural approaches regard the market structure as initial point and 
deduce information about the degree of competition thereafter. By contrast, non-structural 
6approaches investigate performance first to draw conclusions about the market power.
Following the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm the Concentration Ratio and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index are the most prevalent structural methods. However, with 
respect to multi-product companies (such as banks) the definition of the relevant market, e.g.
in terms of specific products and regions, must be considered virtually infeasible. On account 
of this, structural measures have become a controversial matter in recent literature on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds.
2
Avoiding these difficulties non-structural models address 
the characteristic behaviour of the market by analysing individual optimisation problems. A 
first example gives Iwata (1974). Based on oligopolistic markets he simultaneously estimates 
supply and demand functions to compare the actual price with the one in perfect competition. 
The resulting spread then indicates the individual’s market power. While the concept is 
straightforward and simple, the practical implementation is not. The calculation of the market 
equilibrium requires detailed knowledge of both supply and demand side. Due to the data 
requirements the Iwata model is rarely utilised in empirical research.
3
A more common 
approach is presented by Panzar and Rosse (1987).
4
Their “H-statistic” is the sum of 
elasticities of a firm’s total revenue with regard to its factor input prices and can be 
interpreted as an increasing function of elasticity of demand: A H value close to unity
represents a market close to perfect competition. Akin to the Iwata model, there are a few 
drawbacks concerning data collection. Comprehensive company-related information is 
necessary, comprising all input goods and input prices. Another critical issue is the ordinal 
scale of H, which impedes the comparison of markets. Apart from that, the H-statistic only 
delivers mean values of the sample period and therefore hinders an evaluation between
different points in time. The most recent proposal to measure the intensity of competition is 
offered by Boone (2004, 2008).
5
Accordingly, variations in marginal costs affect a company’s 
market share given a constant degree of competition. Thus, lower marginal costs suggest 
higher productivity and therefore higher market share. The underlying theory is based on the 
Efficiency-Structure-Hypothesis of Demsetz (1973) and conflicts with the Relative-Market-
Power paradigm (Shepard 1972) wherein high market shares can also be accompanied by 
above-average marginal costs.
2
See Bikker and Haaf (2002) as well as Carbó et al. (2009) for a deeper insight into the discussion.
3
Breshnahan (1982) alleviates this problem by employing aggregate data, computing results for “average” 
households and companies.
4
Gischer and Stiele (2008) offer an implementation of the Panzar-Rosse approach to assess the competitive 
conditions in banking.
5
Leuvensteijn et al. (2011) are the first to our knowledge who applied the general idea to the specific sector of 
banking.
7After diligent consideration of the alternative concepts, we ultimately agreed on employing 
the well-established Lerner Index to quantify the degree of competition in the EMU banking 
systems. It is our perception that of all non-structural models the Lerner Index is suited best 
for the central questions of this article. First proposed by Lerner (1934) it determines the 
individual price setting power by the company’s ability to raise prices above its marginal 
costs. Under standard assumptions, the first order condition of a profit maximising problem 
yields the following expression:
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Apparently, for time t and country k the Lerner Index of market power ktLI , is defined by 
the disparity between equilibrium output price ktP , and marginal cost kMC as percentage of 
price. The quantity of goods sold is denoted by ktq , , whereas kt , expresses the elasticity of 
demand.
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The Lerner Index ranges between zero and one, whereby larger values indicate less 
competition and more market power. The higher the ability to charge prices above marginal 
costs and the more rigid demand reacts respectively, the higher will be ktLI , . A market close 
to polypoly implies Index values close to zero. Hence, in equilibrium the Lerner Index equals 
the inverse of the elasticity of demand for output of the firm. It is important to note that the 
definition of a precise cut-off point to differentiate between high and low market power is 
infeasible. The Lerner Index is not a metric scale. Thus, interpretations can be drawn from 
relative differences only. As there is no linear relationship between price ktP , and ktLI , , an 
increase of the Index from e.g. 3.0, ktLI to 6.0, ktLI does not signify a doubling of market 
power. A mathematical computation yields:
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The model bears similarities to the one of Panzar and Rosse (1987). Given an isoelastic demand, it can be 
shown that there is a functional converse relationship between H-statistic and Lerner Index: LIH
11 . See 
Shaffer (1983) for derivation.
8There are a number of advantages that militate in favour of the Lerner approach. First, the 
ktLI , value can be easily calculated for companies, groups of companies as well as for the 
total market. Second, not only the absolute level of competition can be illustrated, but also 
developments over time. Third, the concept is regarded as exceptionally insusceptible against 
distortions from company- or country-specific influences (Carbó et al. 2009, p. 128). Beyond
doubt the Lerner Index is well qualified for particular application in the segment of deposit-
based lending business. A number of notable studies have already used the Lerner Index as 
indicator for the degree of market power in banking systems. Valuable works include first and 
foremost Shaffer (1983) with a demonstration for the Canadian banking sector as well as 
Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) with the Italian equivalent. A focus on the sample of EMU 
member countries is to be found in Maudos and Fernàndez de Guevara (2004, 2007), Carbó 
and Rodríguez (2007) and Carbó et al. (2009) and Weill (2011). Generally, the studies 
suggest a worsening of competitive conditions across the euro area during the period of the 
late 1990s and the beginning of the new century. Furthermore, all contributions identify 
noticeable and persistent disparities in the level of competition between various countries.
When computing Lerner Index values the market price is traditionally defined by the 
quotient of total revenues divided by total assets. Hence, both lending business and all other 
business were incorporated. Conclusions about segment-specific market power, for instance 
in the lending business alone, are not feasible with this common approach. In contrast to the 
investigations named above, we attach importance to a precise definition of the relevant 
market. The rich dataset collected from the ECB and the EMU national central banks enables 
us to solely analyse the effect of market power in the traditional lending business. Our
calculation of the Lerner Index is based on the intermediation approach introduced by Sealey 
and Lindley (1977), i.e. loans are considered to be output, whereas deposits are the inputs 
necessary to generate that output. As a result, the output price shall be derived from an 
average national loan rate weighted by volumes and marginal costs shall be received from an 
average national deposit rate weighted by volumes.
7
7
All other costs, e.g. personnel and material costs, are supposed to be constant.
9Equation (1) can thus be modified into:
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where aktA , stands for interest-bearing assets with a = 1, …, n specific loan categories, 
p
ktP , for 
interest-bearing liabilities with p = 1, …, m specific deposit categories and akti , denotes the 
interest on debt at time t in country k. Similarly, pktj , symbolizes the interest on deposit 
transactions at time t in country k. Simplified, we make use of the following relation:
(4)
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where kti , defines the average commercial bank’s loan rate weighted by volumes at time t in 
country k and ktj , its counterpart on the liabilities side.
8
The application of our modified Lerner Index to the banking systems of the European 
Monetary Union yields both interesting and novel results. In the lending business of European 
banks systematic and significant level differences in price setting power become apparent. 
Table 2 displays the degree of competition in selected EMU member countries.
“insert table 2 about here”
On average, Austrian banks charged the lowest mark-ups and exhibited the highest degree 
of competition within the euro area, whereas Greek banks disclosed the most pronounced 
market power. Furthermore, the ability of banks to raise prices above marginal costs is large 
in Portugal, Italy and Spain. In comparison to the structural information on EMU banking 
systems as provided in table 1, interesting results come to light. Luxembourg and Austria are 
characterized by many banks per head, low concentration of major institutions and a low level 
of market power indeed, while the opposite is true for Portugal and Greece. However, the 
8
A technical derivation of the Lerner Index applied for the banking sector can be found in Koetter et al. (2008).
10
Netherlands and Germany show almost identical levels of competition although their 
structural data are highly different. Hence, the outcome demonstrates that structural features 
of banking systems cannot be utilized as faithful indicators to explain the inherent degree of 
competition in banks’ lending business.
The analysis over time brings to light a noticeable trend between 2003 and 2008. The 
considerable initial spread of 47 percentage points between the maximum and the minimum 
Lerner Index value (or between Greece and Luxembourg, respectively) increased even further 
to 53 percentage points in 2008 (Greece and Austria). Our data reveal a rising divergence in 
the degree of competition of the various EMU member countries before the onset of the 
global financial crisis and underline the heterogeneity between banking systems in the euro 
area. Figure 1 illustrates the extent of market power in selected banking systems over time. 
Throughout the total period significant differences in levels can be observed among EMU 
member countries. Our results indicate persistently high values for Greece and Portugal, while 
Austria and Luxembourg are (predominantly) characterized by low degrees of market power
in banks’ lending business. Concerning the level of banking competition it is important to 
note that, for the period 2003-2009, a tendency of convergence cannot be detected within the
euro area.
“insert figure 1 about here”
Apparently, in the years ex ante the financial crisis there seems to be a general trend 
towards lower levels of market power across countries. Only the French banking system 
shows a decrease in competition before 2008. Various policy measures, such as the Financial 
Services Action Plan introduced by the European Union, might supposedly have enhanced 
integration of financial markets and increased contestability of national banking systems. 
Moreover, risk premiums were declining before the global crisis lowering the spread between 
prices and marginal costs. However, the general trend is distorted in 2008 when a substantial 
rise in market power can be recognised in all countries but France. The global financial 
turmoil affected both lending rates and banks’ marginal costs. On the one hand the alteration 
of the ECB tender procedure during the crisis extensively cheapened the refinancing costs of 
all member banks. On the other hand the need for depreciation forced banks to rapidly 
strengthen their revenue side and implicitly raised prices. Ultimately, in terms of degrees of 
competition remarkable differences within the EMU prevail.
In comparison with other current studies that employed the Lerner Index as a measure of 
banking competition within the EMU, e.g. Beck et al. (2011) and Weill (2011), our qualitative 
11
results are confirmed. However, two quantitative differences shall be emphasized. Firstly, in
our calculation the overall level of results is much higher across all countries suggesting that 
market power in the exclusive segment of lending is greater than market power in total
banking business. Secondly, the spread between the maximum and the minimum Lerner Index 
value in the euro area is larger in our approach relative to the common measures introduced 
above. As a result, the heterogeneous effect of monetary policy actions on banks’ lending 
business must be regarded even higher than previously assumed. Consequently, for the sake 
of an accurate measure of competition our methodology uncovers the need for a definition of 
the relevant business segment. The use of banks’ data on total business must be regarded 
imprecise and not beneficial for the analysis of monetary policy transmission.
In conclusion, the diverse national degrees of competition among the euro area banking 
systems represent a potential source of interference with ECB actions. If monetary policy is to 
target the state of the real economy, the central bank authorities have to analyse the extent of 
competition in banks’ lending business rather than market power in banks’ overall activities. 
For this purpose, our novel measurement approach provides a well-qualified indicator for the 
degree of competition in banks’ lending business with non-financial corporations.
4 Econometric Methodology
The aim of our model is to describe the respective effect of each influencing variable on 
the national loan rate in order to detect the diverse impacts of (changes in) monetary policy, 
inflation and the degree of competition in the banking system on that rate. Our goal runs 
contrary to the idea of common VAR models, which regard every variable as endogenously 
determined making it impossible to separately examine the exclusive effect of one variable. 
Therefore, a ceteris paribus assumption, which Sims (1980) intends to avoid when suggesting 
VAR analysis, is a key feature in our approach. We believe that central bank rates as well as 
short-term money market rates are not steered by loan rates and understand the transmission 
process as taking place in one direction only. Our assumption is in line with the findings of 
Cassola and Morana (2006, 24f.). In addition, we examine both expected and unexpected 
changes in the variables. Concerning the former, VAR analysis is not conducive to 
discovering repercussions on other variables. VAR models capture the feedback effects 
12
allowing past and current values of the variables in the system.
9
As a consequence, only 
temporary shock-like changes in monetary policy are able to cause changes in other variables.
Most monetary policy actions, however, represent a systematic response of the central bank to 
the state of the economy and do not come as surprises. As Gottschalk (2001) puts it correctly: 
“Most monetary policy actions are not monetary policy shocks”. The same applies to changes 
in competition and inflation. Impulse response analysis does not account for that. Like a black 
box, VAR models tell little about the detailed mechanism inside. Due to these downsides and 
without the intention to contribute to the ongoing debate about the quality of VAR analysis, 
we reject the latter and choose a deterministic and well-understood approach. The setup of our 
model is based on a theoretical argumentation with a clear causality as follows:
10
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where tr defines the central bank’s official interest rate at time t, i.e. the ECB’s main 
refinancing rate. For each country k we incorporate the Lerner Index ktLI , as a proxy for the 
intensity of competition in an economy’s banking industry. kt ,1
 carries information about 
the national inflation lagged by one period, and tu refers to an error variable with an expected 
value of zero and a constant variance.
To control for structural changes within the period under investigation, we additionally test 
our model (5) in first differences of the endogenous variables as well as of the exogenous 
variables:
(6)  , 0 1 1, 2 3 1 4 , 5 1,t k t k t t t k t k tdi di dr dr dLI d u      
   	  	  	  	  	  	 ,
where d indicates absolute first differences of the variables examined. When investigating the 
pass-through of monetary policy actions to bank lending rates empirical literature often makes 
use of short-term interbank rates, such as the EONIA, as a proxy for the policy-determined 
interest rate. Instead, we directly utilize the central bank’s official rate for two vital reasons. 
First, we place emphasis on the fact that the monetary transmission process is actually a two-
stage one: (1) The central bank rate steers the short-term money market interest rates, which 
in turn (2) affect market rates with longer maturities and retail bank interest rates. The 
9
The respectable works of Stock and Watson (2001), Christiano et al. (1999), Cochrane (1998), Rudebusch 
(1998) and Sims (1998) give a comprehensive insight into the discussion.
10
The closest models to ours are the deterministic approaches of Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) and Toolsema et 
al. (2001) investigating interdependencies between central bank and loan rates.
13
distortions on interbank markets during the financial crisis of 2008/09 illustrated that a 
synchronous co-movement of official rate and money market rates cannot be taken for 
granted. Second, we regard the EONIA as inappropriate as the volatility of the short end of 
the yield curve is influenced by the liquidity management of banks. Due to high payment 
flows this is particularly obvious on the last day of the month or quarter and the last days of 
the maintenance period.
11
Neither are these volatilities related to monetary policy actions nor 
do they influence lending rates. Thus, these two downsides outweigh the convenience of daily 
fluctuations in short-term money market rates when applying OLS regression models.
Our study covers the period from January 2003 to December 2009 and 84 observations 
accordingly. The starting date enables us to make use of the harmonised ECB interest rate 
statistics, which were introduced at that time. Older data can only be constructed by 
employing non-harmonised national interest rate statistics based on different definitions and 
sub-categories for each instrument category. In order to avoid the large heterogeneity across
countries inherent in the data and a possible bias in our results, we circumvent a data break by 
solely using the Eurosystem statistics. The analysis is conducted for all 11 founding member 
countries of the EMU and Greece, which joined the union in 2001.
The quality of our data set allows for a valuable contribution to the large literature on 
interest rate variations within the EMU. As the ECB publishes interest rates for various 
categories and maturities for every member country, but no corresponding national volumes, 
previous studies mainly focused on investigating specific credit categories and avoided 
statements on the total amount of credit. What has been largely missing so far is an analysis 
on a national loan rate that represents the whole spectrum of relevant credits. For identifying 
the effects of monetary policy, inflation and competition on the lending business, we regard 
an interest rate for new credit approvals alone as the relevant rate kti , . In contrast to the total 
amount of credits outstanding, the impact of changes in the influencing variables can be 
detected more clearly in conditions for new business. To compute the relevant loan rate kti , ,
we collected rates across the categories and maturities of the ECB harmonised cross-country 
data to weigh them by their volumes published by the respective national central bank. In 
doing so, we focused on loans other than revolving loans, overdrafts, convenience and 
extended credit card debt for non-financial corporations (annualized agreed rate). To the best 
of our knowledge, this paper displays the first approach that tackled the laborious way 
11
See Colarossi and Zaghini (2009, 155) as well as Bartolini and Prati (2006, 354f.) for empirical verification. 
Besides, during the period 01.01.2007-31.12.2009 correlating changes in the ECB main refinancing rate with 
changes in the daily EONIA rate yields a result of 0.38 suggesting that not even 50 % of the EONIA fluctuations 
could be explained by variations in the central bank rate during the financial crisis.
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through every national central bank to calculate an accurate interest rate for total new business 
comparable across all member countries. By this, the explanatory power of conclusions 
regarding national lending business has risen significantly. 
There are a least two vital reasons to concentrate on a loan rate instead of an interest rate 
for deposits when analysing the effects of monetary policy and the degree of competition in a 
banking system. Rarely does monetary policy actions target at conditions for deposits only. 
Besides, due to asymmetric information in the lending business the latter is usually less 
contestable than the deposit-taking business and therefore more susceptible to market power
(see Beck et al. 2004). Consequently, structural changes in the banking industry will affect the 
loan rate of the banks concerned to a greater extent than their deposit rates.
The central bank’s official interest rate tr is obtained from the ECB’s main refinancing 
operations (MRO). From June 2000 to September 2008 these were conducted as variable rate 
tenders. Then, the official rate was specified by the minimum interest rate at which 
counterparties may place their bids. Since October 2008 the MRO are carried out through a 
fixed-rate tender procedure, defining that fixed rate as the official rate tr .
12
For each country 
inflation kt ,
 is taken from the annual percentage change of the harmonized indices of 
consumer prices (HICP). The Lerner Index ktLI , includes the loan rate kti , as a surrogate for 
the sales price, whereas an appropriate deposit rate needs to be found as a proxy for marginal 
costs. As banks generally do not differentiate between deposits of households and 
corporations when refinancing its’ issued credits, we use a weighted average of deposit rates 
paid on households’ and corporate capital, comprising all categories and maturities of the 
ECB harmonised data set. We are convinced that this calculation of the Lerner Index is the 
most accurate approach given the current data availability.
The intuition that variations of the ECB’s official rate and national inflation lead 
adjustments in the national loan rate shall be tested. A popular approach to evaluate causal 
relations between two time series is to examine if the prediction of one series could be 
improved by incorporating information of the other. More specifically, if the variance of the 
prediction error of loan rate kti , at the present time is reduced by inclusion of past values from 
time series tr and kt ,
 , then the latter time series are said to have a causal influence on the 
loan rate respectively. If every influencing variable significantly contributes to forecasting 
12
The lag length was chosen in accordance with the minimum value of the Schwarz information criterion.
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kti , , we speak of Granger causality in each case.
13
The positions of two time series can be
reversed to assess the causal influence in the opposite direction. Both alternatives must be 
controlled. If the influencing variables are capable of Granger-causing the national loan rate 
with no equal effect vice versa, the setup of our OLS regression model seems well-grounded.
“insert table 3 about here”
The results reported in table 3 (predominantly) suggest causality in one direction: tr and 
kt ,
 Granger cause loan rate kti , , at least in the temporal sense. Hence, the structure of our 
multivariate regression model follows a justified intuition.
Particular strands of the empirical literature entertain some doubt about the stationarity of 
interest rates, including Karfakis and Moschos (1990), Chong et al. (2006) and De Graeve et 
al. (2007). In this paper, we employ both the common Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) 
and the KPSS test proposed by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). Results for the model (5) are 
reported in tables A1 and A2 of the appendix. The ADF clearly suggests stationary inflation 
rates in all member countries except Finland, Ireland and Portugal over the whole sample 
whereas it cannot deny non-stationarity for the national loan rate, the ECB official rate and 
the Lerner Index. One might argue that the failure to detect a stationary time series originates
from the lack of power of the ADF test statistics. In this regard the KPSS test, in which the 
null hypothesis is stationarity, features apparent advantages. In fact, conducting the KPSS test 
yields interesting results. For the whole period and for every member country but Portugal the 
null of stationary loan rate kti , cannot be rejected. Furthermore, the central bank’s official rate 
tr is proposed to be stationary as well. With the exception of a few smaller members of the 
EMU, the same conclusion holds for national inflation kt ,
 and Lerner Index ktLI , . Thus, the 
KPSS test supports our notion that the time series applied here need not necessarily be non-
stationary. However, neither on the basis of common stationarity tests nor in reference to the 
inconsistent literature can we draw a clear conclusion about the order of integration of our 
variables. Therefore, testing for cointegration is not an option, as the technique can only be 
applied to time series that are integrated of the same order. To mitigate this problem, we
eventually prefer to work with a regression model in first differences.
13
It is important to note that the concept used her is in the probabilistic and temporal sense, rather than the 
philosophical or structural sense.
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Apart from that, we test for multi-collinearity among the explanatory variables. In model 
(5) a considerably high R-squared can be observed in almost every country. Computing the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for all of our regression coefficients in every sample country 
we obtain a value close to or above 10, which not only indicates collinearity among the 
exogenous variables, but (as well) demonstrates convincing arguments for conducting a 
model in first differences as shown in model (6).
14
Testing model (6) for potential non-stationarity and multi-collinearity confirms our 
approach.
15
In the ADF test statistic the null hypothesis of non-stationary changes of the 
national loan rate tdr can be rejected for all sample countries but Belgium, Luxemburg and 
Portugal. Applying the KPSS test, stationarity cannot be denied for (changes in) any national 
loan rate. Besides, both tests implicate stationary fluctuations in inflation rates ,t kd
 for all 
countries as well as stationary central bank rate adjustments tdr . According to the ADF test 
results, changes in the national degree of competition ,t kdLI can be regarded as stationary for 
all banking systems but the Dutch and Portuguese one. The KPSS test confirms that finding 
for all sample countries except Belgium and Luxemburg, and cannot reject stationarity for the 
Dutch and Portuguese market. Hence, both test statistics validate the assumption of stationary 
variables in model (6). Moreover, this approach will not give rise to multi-collinearity 
problems. Our calculations of the respective VIFs yield values well below 10.
16
It is therefore 
appropriate to model the influences on national loan rates in first differences of the explaining 
variables. Subsequent explanations will therefore refer to model (6) only.
5 Results
Our results underline the particular importance of banking competition in the lending 
business to variations of national loan rates. Implicitly, changes in the national degrees of 
banks’ market power turn out to be a major source of interference with monetary policy 
actions. Table 4 subsumes the key results of our OLS regression model, which are determined 
by application of White’s Test for Heteroskedasticity (White 1980). A potential 
misspecification of the model is tested by the Ramsey RESET and can be rejected for all 
countries but France and Finland.
14
Owing to lack of space the multitude of VIFs is not reported in this paper but is available from the authors 
upon request.
15
Results of the ADF and KPSS test statistics can be found in tables A3 and A4 of the appendix respectively.
16
As for model (5), the multitude of VIFs of model (6) is not reported in this paper but is available from the 
authors upon request.
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“insert table 4 about here”
At first, the general set-up of our model is confirmed by the respective test procedures. The 
coefficient of determination indicates that, on average, about 64 % of the variation in national 
lending rates can be explained by the exogenous variables. The F-statistic points out that the 
interdependencies illustrated in table 4 are not randomly generated.
As regards our chosen regressors, we find highly significant support for the hypotheses that 
both the current and lagged variation of the ECB official rate positively influence the 
commercial banks’ adjustment of the loan rate. Across all EMU member countries the 
explanatory impact of both variables is significant at the 1 % level suggesting a fast pass-
through of adjustments in the key interest rate. Likewise, we demonstrate that changes in the 
degree of banks’ domestic market power substantially alter national lending rates. As a result, 
independently from ECB actions, banking market competition severely affects the funding 
conditions of domestic enterprises and thus potentially interferes with monetary policy 
intentions. By contrast, only in very few countries does the inflation rate difference have a 
significant effect on the market loan rate. This is explicitly true for Austria and Belgium. As 
should have been expected, in almost all countries the lagged first difference of the national 
lending rate shows no significant coefficient. Hence, we can clearly reject adaptive 
expectations in the majority of banking systems.
Our findings highlight the effectiveness of ECB monetary policy. Within two months, a 
high share of an initial change in the key interest rate is passed on to the national loan rates.
Among the EMU member states, only France and Germany show rather moderate responses 
to monetary measures with cumulated coefficients of 0.619 and 0.708 respectively. However, 
although official rate alterations are almost fully transmitted in the short-term, our results give 
evidence that the ECB is not capable of perfectly steering lending rates in the EMU. Changes 
in banks’ market power, due to mergers between institutions or modifications in competition 
policies, represent an additional major source of loan rate variations that cannot be controlled 
by central bank authorities. The impact of changes in the Lerner Index ktdLI , on the national 
loan rate is heterogeneous throughout the euro area. Analysing descriptive information from 
table 2 and estimations’ results of table 4, there seems to be an interdependency between the 
level of market power and the impact changes in market power have on the respective lending 
rate. Relatively low coefficients can be found in countries which exhibit high degrees of 
competition, such as Austria and Luxembourg. On the contrary, adjustments in the Lerner 
Index strongly influence national loan rates in EMU members that show low levels of 
18
competition (Greece, Italy). With reference to the lending business in euro area banking 
systems, we tentatively believe that the lower the level of competition is, the stronger a 
change in market power affects domestic funding rates.
In summary, independently from ECB measures the degree of competition in national 
banking systems significantly influences the loan rates in the EMU. Therefore, market power 
in the lending business must be regarded a vital source of interference with official monetary 
policy. The actual extent of interference appears to depend on the level of competition in 
domestic banking markets.
6 Conclusion
If monetary policy in the European Currency Union is to target lending rates in the 
individual member countries, which arguably represent the crucial link between monetary and
real economy, policymakers need to incorporate a precise measure of banking competition in 
their analysis. In utilising a modified Lerner Index, we provide a qualified indicator to 
calculate the degree of market power in the domestic lending business to non-financial 
corporations. We ultimately show that independently from central bank actions national loan 
rates are affected by changes in the respective level of competition. Across countries, the 
impact of the competitive environment on lending rates greatly differs. As a consequence, the 
transmission of monetary policy within the euro area is hardly predictable in detail. A central 
bank that operates in a supposedly uniform currency area despite severe structural differences 
between the member states is almost inevitably bound to fail in reaching its targets.
We are thoroughly convinced that a conformation of European banking market structures 
and a convergence of the respective levels of competition will not arise in the foreseeable 
future. The financial crisis caused monetary financial institutions to rather reduce foreign 
business activities. As the ECB cannot overcome the heterogeneous conditions of its 
transmission mechanism, we believe that supplementary measures need to be implemented. 
Promising concepts would include (1) an intensified coordination of European economic 
policies within the Eurogroup as well as (2) the introduction of monetary policy instruments 
which can be scaled unequally in case of diverse national developments. Variable national 
minimum reserve requirements within the European Currency Union, set on a monthly basis,
can be named as a favourable instrument.
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